Figure 1: Damage caused by reported natural disasters 1975 2010. (source: Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). 2012. International Disaster Data Base, Catholic Univer sity of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. (http://www.emdat.be/)
Estimate damage ($US billion) have lost their lives in some of these events and the overall losses and cost of reconstruction is close to $500 billion dollars. Increasing damage costs are the trend over the past three de cades ( Figure 1 ).
In all large disasters the central (national) government is called upon to provide support in terms of financial and technical assistance, as well to provide a leadership role in designing the strategy for recovery. In less developed countries, central government struggles to provide leadership and resources. In developed countries, the central government plays a major role with direct management of the recovery process or, as in the United States, it supplies funding and technical support. In this way recovery becomes a partnership, however unequal between the survivors (people and businesses) and govern ment. The way the partnerships are formed and carried out de termines the path to recovery. These partnerships evolve and adapt to changing conditions in real time.
This article discusses three countries (Japan, Chile, New Zea land) where I visited the disaster areas, spoke to the local people and worked with NGOs and government agencies to understand the recovery process and assist in it. What they have in common is that they have suffered their largest disas ter event in modern history between the years 2010-2011, all at the hands of an earthquake. These events also are multi locational, spanning more than a single city, district, or state. They occurred along coastal areas, inland, and in some cases impacted cities for hundreds of kilometers. The vast spatial mix in locations, in topography, in geology, and in impact to historic sites creates complex planning challenges. All of these countries are advanced societies in terms of economic status, functioning democratic practices, and stable governments. They suffer not from threats of war and social conflict, but from multi-natural hazard threats. Can their recovering process make these areas more resilient against future threats and pos sibly more sustainable? Can design approaches help, and how do planners begin to understand the needs of the local people and help them?
The time frame used in this paper is two years or less from the initial event(s). This is not enough time for an assessment of comprehensive recovery, but enough time to establish the re covery strategy and the types of partnerships between the sur vivors and their governments. While each country adapts and recovers in its own way, central government involvement is a constant, although expressed in different ways. While there is a common saying that "all disaster is local, " there is also a reality that "all local disaster survivors want the central government to help them with the damage to their lives and property. "
While each country has its own story based on its own histori cal context, all have things in common. They are prone to seis mic, volcanic, and tsunami events. For example, Japan experi ences 20% of all 6.0 magnitude and above earthquakes while living on just one percent of the earth's surface. Each country has a long coastline that is subject to tsunami events. There are also clear differences with Japan having a history of at least two thousand years, while Chile (established in 1818) and New Zealand (established in 1840) are younger countries with Euro pean roots. Chile was a former colony of Spain with immigrant communities from Italy and Germany, and New Zealand has Anglo-Saxon roots as former colony of England and Scotland. They have differing governmental systems and democratic tra ditions. All have legal planning systems for the regulation of land use, buildings construction and public safety.
Growing Interest in Disaster Risk Reduction
The recognition that large scale disasters cause increasing amounts of property damage and extensive disruption to the local economy has led governments in industrialized countries to seek to lower impacts using two major strategies. First are structural measures that strengthen the built environment. Bet ter building codes, higher levees, stronger bridges are examples of such measures. The other strategy is non-structural measures. Avoiding building in a high flood area or on top of an earth quake fault, removing brush from around buildings, and estab lishing evacuation routes, and buying insurance are examples of non-structural actions. A third strategy also has emerged; it can be called "behavioral. " This includes educating people to under stand hazard risks and taking some actions to lower impacts.
All of these strategies fall under a broader umbrella called di saster risk reduction. This paper uses a simple three-part frame work: assessment, dialogue and action ( Wisner et al., 2011) . The framework: Assessment, Dialogue and Action (Figure 2 ) is not linear, but interactive; and I use it in this way. In reality, the com ponents and feedback provide information and iterate. In this way they are a design process. Each, however, requires its own time frame to complete, and can cause (as we see in the case of New Zealand) considerable conflict as to how geo-seismic knowledge is generated and then applied in the dialogue frame.
Assessment
What caused the disaster in each country and what was its im- (source: Wisner et al., 2012) pact? Table 1 provides comparative information on the three countries related to the disaster event. The administrative re covery organization information is shown in Table 2 . The Tim ing of Major Actions is presented in Table 3 . These three tables create a disaster profile.
The recovery plan or strategy, issued by the central government, or its recovery agency, envisions a decade of effort. Why ten years is a common number is not clear. Generally most central governments realize that certain restoration actions are required before reconstruction can take place, and that the complexity of recovery in administrative, social, technical and administrative terms simply takes time, more than is usually estimated. Each country faces different technical and engineering challenges. This is an important finding. It establishes that we need to know a great deal about local conditions (geotechnical, topographic, historical) in order to make proper recovery decisions.
Japan, with its earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, faces the most difficult challenge of the three. Based on progress in year one, Iwate and Myagi prefectures can meet their ten-year goal. In the Fukushima prefecture it will take at least two gen erations to complete the tasks of decommissioning the nuclear plants and decontamination of the surrounding areas.
Temporary housing
With the loss of so many houses due to the tsunami, 55,000 temporary units were built in Japan and installed within three months of the disaster. These are factory built units, assembled on site and fully serviced by power and water. Most of these are scattered site clusters averaging 30-40 units, although some large 100-150-unit groups do exist. In some prefectures, private rentals have been used for temporary units. The central government pays the costs of this temporary housing. While a two-year maximum stay was originally estimated, some areas will need to extend this up to five years due to difficulties in providing buildable sites.
All of the fishing ports along the impacted coastline of Iwate, Myagi, and Fukushima prefectures suffered damages ranging from loss of boats, ropes for seaweed cultivation, to destruc tion of fish processing factories. After one year, new equip ment has been obtained and over 50% of the fishing fleet has returned to the sea. Due in part to a special government work support program all survivors and evacuees can get employ ment. There is actually a shortage of labor in the Tohoku re gion due to all the recover work under way.
New Zealand faces a dual challenge. The Canterbury district, located on the eastern coast of the South Island, experienced a series of earthquakes of large size and thousands of aftershocks over a nine-month period. The accumulation of quakes kept damaging more buildings and caused extensive soil deforma tion (liquefaction and lateral spread) over large areas of Christ Church's central city and its eastern suburbs. This resulted in the demolition of half of all the buildings in the central busi ness district of Christchurch (the nation's second largest city of 380,000), and its landmark building, the Christchurch Anglican Cathedral, still scheduled to be torn down. Three thousand of the central business districts 5,000 businesses have been closed. The soil deformation is so extensive in eastern resi dential areas that over 7,000 houses have been declared nonrepairable and will be purchased by the central government.
All the homeowners will need to find houses in other areas of the district. This will create a resettlement to areas away from the central city as new housing is built on available green-field sites identified in the Environment Canterbury district growth plan. The central city needs to be rebuilt as an attractive place for commerce, business, tourism, the arts and entertainment. Such an effort means that urban design needs to play a role in economic development as well as "public realm" creation.
Chile faces the challenge of reconstruction of many cities along its coast and also in the interior. For coastal cities, safety from tsunami is the key land planning issue as well as prevent ing building where there is soil deformation in parts of the major cities of Concepción and Talcahuano. In the interior of the country the challenges are replacement of the thousands of adobe buildings and finding enough land that can be eas ily supplied with infrastructure services. The third challenge is restoration of the many historic buildings (mostly churches). The desire to restore many historic buildings made of adobe or unreinforced masonry has spawned new research in structur ally sound bricks and possibly the use of new plastic sheeting with similar structural characteristics. Until such research can be completed, hundreds of historic buildings remain closed for public use, and will be subject to further deterioration and damage from future earthquakes.
Chile faces a challenge in rebuilding 190,000 destroyed and damaged houses, resettling the survivors living in temporary villages (known as Aldeas), and replacing 30,000 units of so cial housing that do not meet current building codes and are structurally vulnerable. Overall, when built to modern codes, mid-rise buildings have performed well, with a few notable ex ceptions including two buildings in Concepción, Chile.
Land use, a common thread
Land use is a central issue in all of these recovery cases, but for different reasons. In Japan the issue expresses itself through location of safe residential areas from tsunamis, because these waves caused the greatest loss of life and mass evacuations. Evacuation safety can be achieved in different ways: moving far away from the risk (avoidance), building sea wall defenses, or providing evacuation strategies for buildings sited in precar ious places (e.g. develop strong buildings with protected stairs to reach floors higher than the oncoming waves) (Figure 2 ). In many Chilean coastal communities the issues of tsunami pro tection and of liquefaction are present. Again communities are faced with choices. The central government, however, has cho sen to implement expansion of sea barrier open parks through expropriation of houses close to the ocean in at least the follow ing towns: Dichacto, Constitución and Talcahuana (Figure 3) . In each case, the people losing their homes were against this, but were compensated at full value of their house and land. Con ducting the expropriation does take time and was required be fore housing was rebuilt in nearby areas with less tsunami risk.
The Canterbury region of New Zealand faces a series of land use issues, the largest being land damage from the earthquake causes liquefaction, vertical land level changes (e.g. streets higher than the driveways into adjacent houses) and lateral spreading under thousands of houses. Within one year, 100,000 properties were surveyed for land damage. A cordon placed around the central business district forced many businesses to close, even if the buildings they occupied suffered less than terminal damage (Figure 4 ). Private companies working for the central government recovery agency determined the extent of liquefaction and damage to a property. More than half of the 2,400 buildings in the central city area were severely damaged. In the end it was the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency that decided land use suitability and zoning. The local munici pality had a secondary role in this process.
In Japan, while the earthquake caused damage to pre-1981 built houses, overall it was minor. The major damage was caused by the tsunami. Thus all town and prefecture recovery plans address the need for more safety. The three main strate gies for this are shown in Figure 5 Table 2 speaks to this point in terms of the very large number of impacted cities in Chile and Japan.
Chile
Chile and Japan used community plans as a stepping stone for initial dialogue. The Chilean government provided funds and consulting support for two regional efforts to create munici pal recovery plans. One effort was in the Bío Bío Region, where the regional governor facilitated the design of 18 master plans for cities. Concepción, the region's largest city conducted their own separate process. These plans, developed under the guidance of regional staff and consultants, worked with the local people to create a vision for reconstruction and identi fied the most important projects and areas that needed to be addressed. The plans however are not legal or binding docu ments. They are advisory to the local government, but could be adopted and integrated into the legal master plan. These plans also form the basis for a further level of discussion on specific areas and projects. These plans can also introduce hazard and inundation maps.
The second Chilean plan effort provided funding for 27 recov ery plans to cities in the O'Higgins and Maule regions conduct ed with the assistance of a team from the Pontificia Universi dad Catolia de Chile (PUC). Coastal plans and inland plans were developed along with extensive analysis of the geotecnical status of the communities. These plans, like those in Bío Bío are advisory to the local towns. All of these plans had a citizen par ticipation component and various levels of consult support. In at least three coastal towns the plans called for risk avoidance through expropriate of areas close to the ocean.
Additional strategic recontruction plans were made for larger interior cities such as Talca and Curició. The Talca strategic plan was made with donated private funds, the assistance of a private consultant, under an agreement with the city gov ernment, the regional governor, and the housing ministry. The Curició plan was also conducted by a private consultant with donated funds, as well as from a local government and region al governor agreement. All of these plans have a public par ticipant component, but none give local community (neighor hood) groups shared governance in the plan making process. The community input is consultative.
Japan
In Japan, all cities in the impacted Miyagi and Iwate impacted prefectures, along with the prefectures, developed their own plans within six months of the 2011 tsunami. These plans were made with a mixture of volunteer professionals, consultants and local residents. There was no central government oversight in the plan making process, and the central government pro vided funds for consultant support in each municipality. Volun teer professionals from outside the community have played im portant roles in helping local neighborhoods sort out complex technical issues related to seawall heights, elevation of land for relocation areas, and population projects related to the need for public buildings such as schools. The continued level of vol unteer support in Japan is impressive and useful, especially as many survivors are living in scattered temporary shelters.
The central government's Basic Guidelines for Recovery, issued four months after the tsunami, calls for a model that places the project planning at the municipal level and the project funding at the ministerial level. The plan sets down the town's principles and vision. Overall, they call for the following: ensuring safety, rebuilding lives, and expansion of technology and natural re source based industry. The basic land use proposals generally are built around a chosen risk avoidance strategy. The plans function as the basis for developing specific recovery projects.
There are many small bays along the varying topography of what is called the Sanriku Coast. In each bay there is usually at least one village, and some municipalities are composed of many bays. There is a real planning challenge, as shown in Fig  ure 6 , where four towns were merged in 2005 to create Minani sanrikucho. Plans are needed for these smaller areas, each with its own culture, economic base and land use and hazard profile.
New Zealand
The New Zealand dialogue takes a different form. The central government created the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA) with extensive powers to conduct the recovery planning for the district (that contains three cities and a district authority). The authority is located and operates from Christchurch. Christchurch, the main city in the region, was tasked with developing only a Center Business District (CBD) Recovery Plan. The recovery strategy is developed by CERA itself, along with directing a special infrastructure reconstruction group known as Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT ), a multi-jurisdictional public-private group for major infrastructure recovery, including a new wastewater plant, which incorporates hazard mitigation design.
The city of Christchurch ran an extensive plan-making process for the central city, with the assistance of an urban design con sultant from Europe, and completed a series of community workshops and input sessions that yielded 104,000 sugges tions from people in the region. This plan was not adopted by the Christchurch City Council, but was sent to the central Figure 6 . Minamisanrikucko, Myagi Prefecture, Japan. (source: Ishikawa 2012a) government earthquake minister for review. The Minister has responded by calling for a special planning unit to be estab lished to propose a set of feasible projects in the CBD. The city's CBD plan has not moved forward.
Action
Hopefully in this phase the decisions made in the other phases of the framework lead to the allocation of resources (human, governance, fiscal and physical) and action. In these countries there exists a tension between central government ministries and local government related to how, where and when recov ery occurs. This can lead to friction, as a local urban design proj ect will wait for funding until a larger regional transportation improvement effort is completed. All of the countries present ed have made progress towards recovery, but in different ways. 
Chile
Chile has been engaged in recovery for two full years. Among the actions taken are: rapid establishment of recovery funding, a housing subsidy program, local planning efforts, assistance to the fishing areas, and a separate effort for reconstruction of his toric buildings. The central government approved a multi-billion dollars recovery budget. The division of labor to selected minis tries was quickly assigned and a plan for reconstruction issued six months from the time of the disaster. The model used by the central government for housing reconstruction involves subsi dies to low and modest income people who lost homes, with the construction being done by the private sector. The private sector is to obtain building permission from the local govern ment. Local government is charged with being the gatekeeper for where to build, and also is the entity responsive for determin ing if the site is safe and can obtain needed infrastructure ser vices (water, power, etc.) . The private utility providers completed major infrastructure recovery within three to twelve months.
At the end of the first year, 128,000 subsidies had been given, and by the end of the second year, all 220,000 were awarded (see Table 3 ). Transforming the subsidies into actual houses rested with the basic choice of using a market driven model and a local government gatekeeper model. Some cities have been only able to give permits for twenty houses. Due to the lag in performance, two years after the event, national legis lation was passed allowing the regional office of the Housing Ministry to provide direct assistance to some cities in order to increase housing production. This assistance will be done with the cooperation of local government, but the technical issues, including issuing needed permits, will be managed by the re gional office (Regional Secretariat for Housing and Planning). This action decreases the level of decentralized (local) control over the process, but will get more housing built.
Criticism of the Chilean experience includes lack of community input, poor design solutions for replacement housing in such towns as Talca, and expropriation of lands adjacent to the Pacific Ocean instead of a sea wall of sea barrier solution. Overall the recovery has tested the capacity of local government to respond more than the capacity of central government to lead. Criticism 8: Christ Church Central City; proposed "Frame Plan". (source: Christchurch Central Recovery Plan; CERA website) over vernacular design solutions may not be well founded as each local government has final approval of projects.
Japan
During the sixteen months since the 2011 tsunami, Japan has been faced with stabilizing a nuclear accident, building 55,000 units of temporary houses, making new estimates of its earth quake predication and tsunami models, creating a central gov ernment reconstruction agency, and committing multi-billions of dollars in recovery assistance. Within nine months, 90% of the work lost had been replaced (through a combination of getting employers back in business, new business and recov ery job creation schemes). The reconstruction agency is called the "one-stop shop, " however, it is the separate ministries that draw up the guidelines for project applications and control re sources. ( This includes the most powerful agency, the Minis try of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.) While it is a bottoms up process from the local level, the issuing of project funds is a top down process. This process worked well enough to issue 2.5 trillion yen in combined support less than one year after the event, with 44% of the funds being housing related.
Uncertainty is the operative word about the long-term outcome of the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear plant clean up and remedia tion of surrounding lands. The nuclear plants remain unstable and present a difficult decommissioning task. This is being ad dressed by a separate new nuclear commission under the Min istry of the Environment, and is outside the purview of the Re construction Agency. In sixteen months, a plan for rezoning the towns that fall under the evacuation zone has been developed, and a program to purchase properties within the restricted zone as well as compensation for loss of livelihood has been estab lished. Japan's Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (1961) , in its infancy, places no cap on the operator's nuclear liability.
New Zealand
The New Zealand situation reflects various levels of complex ity. After twenty months, technical analysis of the areas in the Canterbury region with soil damage have been completed and all neighborhoods know if they can rebuild or not. While the government has acquired almost half of the "7,000 red zone" properties, the other half are still being processed. This is a dif ficult and time-consuming process because some people do not wish to sell out to the government even though remaining there means having no infrastructure services provided. The final agreements between the Earthquake Commission (the Crown insurance entity) and the reinsurers are still to be made. SCIRT is doing well in forging new levels of partnership gov ernance for DDR infrastructure in the region. This means the engineering focus is now on mitigation of risk, not on cost con tainment. This is a significant step forward in holistic recovery.
The final CERA Recovery Strategy document and a central city development plan was announced in August 2012. This plan is the result of New Zealand consultant consortium of design and project management professionals, and will focus on a defined central city area. It is here that urban design should make its best contribution. This plan will replace the one drawn up and adopted created by the Christ Church City Council in December 2011. This plan reflects the power of CERA as an ex tension of the central government and also a rejection of the previous plan making process.
The New Zealand insurance scheme is unique in the world and complicates this recover. Over 90% of the country's population holds seismic insurance coverage for the house, the contents and the land under the house. This large coverage is possible as the seismic insurance is a required add-on to fire insurance, which most people buy. There are two payers of the coverage in case of a claim: a government agency known as the Earthquake Commission (EQC) and private insurers (local companies and re-insurance companies). The EQC is liable for the first $100,000 of property damage (including land damage) and $20,000 in personal property. Claims above this amount are to be paid by the private insurer. Because there were so many earthquakes in the area, some 459,000 claims have been filled to date and a total of $AU 3.77 billion have been paid as of October 1, 2011. This is almost twice the total residential housing stock (220,000) of the Canterbury area. The high number of claims is due to multiple earthquakes. New Zealand is unique in the world in this type of seismic coverage, where the vast majority of people participate. For the most part this makes it far easier to address the permanent housing replacement needs. The challenge for planning is where to locate the permanent housing.
The Recovery Strategy focuses on identifying work to be pro grammed. This work is linked to a set of nine CERA priorities, the top five being: safety and well being, investment condi tions, infrastructure repair, supply of land for recovery needs, and coordinated work across central governments, local au thorities, insurers, and the private sector.
Discussion
All of these countries have made people's safety the first pri ority. Each is using land use controls, new building codes and improved standards for location of shelter, commerce and civic structures in creating the new urban form for the multitude of cities that need assistance.
Due to the nuclear accident, Japan faces the most complicated recovery task, but it has the most contemporary experience with recovery and a national consensus to rebuild livelihoods as well as the built environment. In many ways Chile has recov ered quickly, and has provided its cities and towns with new technical information on which to make future land use deci sions. After eighteen months of deciding where not to build, and a commitment to mitigation of its infrastructure risk, Christ Church is ready to rebuild. It still faces challenges of paying to rebuild confidence that it is a safe place. Each has used a differ ent government-civic-private sector model, in part based on its fiscal capacity and its legal and cultural views of recovery.
All, in a real sense, look towards the market (the private sector) for positive long-term recovery. All, in some way, have also real ized that all levels of government have a special responsibility to protect its people. Hopefully they will take this lesson to heart and prioritize safety for the homes and well-being of people.
